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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Strategic Nonconformity to the TCJA, Part I: 
Personal Income Taxes
by Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage
The dire revenue situation that COVID-19 has 
created for state and local governments is a well-
documented and looming reality for state 
legislatures. We and others have explored a 
variety of ways that states should respond to this 
crisis in prior articles as a part of Project SAFE 
(State Action in Fiscal Emergencies), an academic 
effort to help states weather the fiscal crisis by 
providing policy recommendations backed by 
research.1 We think, as do many others,2 that in the 
absence of sufficient federal action, the states 
should prioritize raising revenue through 
targeted taxes on economic actors that are best 
enduring the crisis, rather than cutting services 
needed to protect state economies or state 
residents suffering more from the crisis.3
With those background goals, this article 
focuses on the ways that states could raise revenue 
by rethinking whether and how they conform to 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. This article is the first in 
a planned two-part series, with this article 
focusing on strategic nonconformity with the 
TCJA for state-level personal income taxes, and 
with the planned second article in the series to 
then focus on strategic nonconformity with the 
TCJA for state-level corporate income taxes.
The TCJA was signed into law December 22, 
2017, and went into effect January 1, 2018.4 That 
timing, along with the rushed manner in which 
the bill was introduced and debated in Congress, 
meant that states had little time to respond. States 
that conformed to the tax code on a rolling basis 
had to affirmatively act if they wanted to decouple 
from those changes, which obviously put them in 
a difficult position. Fixed conformity states faced 
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors examine the ways that 
states could raise revenue by rethinking 
whether and how they conform to the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act.
1
Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in 
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471; University of 
Virginia School of Law, Project SAFE; David Gamage and Darien 
Shanske, “States Should Consider Partial Wealth Tax Reforms,” Tax Notes 
State, May 18, 2020, p. 859; Adam Thimmesch, “State Tax Conformity: 
The CARES Act and Beyond,” Tax Notes State, May 25, 2020, p. 987.
2
Carolina Vargas, “Massachusetts Economists Push for Higher Taxes 
Amid Pandemic,” Tax Notes Today State, May 29, 2020.
3
See Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal 
Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749 (2010).
4
Some provisions, like the full expensing, applied retroactively. See 26 
U.S.C. section 168(k)(6)(a)(i) (granting a 100 percent allowance for some 
assets placed in service after September 27, 2017).
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similar issues. They had to update their 
conformity dates if they wanted to adopt the 
changes in the TCJA and had to affirmatively 
carve out any modifications that they did not wish 
to adopt.5 Most states tended to follow their 
default positions of conformity and adopted the 
majority of the TCJA’s changes, with the most 
notable exception being the treatment of the 
revenue-raising provisions aimed at U.S. 
multinationals.
In the flurry of activity surrounding the TCJA, 
most state legislatures did not think deeply about 
how their tax bases should relate to the federal 
base. That response was understandable given 
that legislatures are busy and that the country was 
in the midst of an economic expansion. But the 
time has come for states to take a more careful 
look at TCJA conformity.
Why States Should Respond Strategically
States have not generally responded 
strategically6 to federal tax law, much less to the 
TCJA. The revenue hole that states now find 
themselves in should be enough reason for them 
to change course. But there are several other 
reasons as well. First, this pandemic has 
presented states with challenges they could not 
have anticipated, and recovery will take sacrifice 
by many for the long-term benefit of the whole 
community. It might sound hokey to some, but 
joint sacrifice is important nonetheless. To the 
extent that some taxpayers are receiving tax 
benefits at the federal level, asking them to pay 
more at the state level is, all else equal, a 
reasonable request.
Second, the scale of the emergency requires a 
massive federal response, but such a response has 
not been forthcoming. Clawing back windfalls 
doled out by the TCJA would be an exercise in 
self-help akin to how states have had to scramble 
to get protective equipment for their first 
responders. If the federal government will not do 
its job and provide states with the support they 
need, the states must secure revenue for 
themselves.
State action as self-help is all the more 
compelling if the federal government is not doing 
its job based on a belief that it cannot afford to.7 
We think that belief is false,8 but even if it were 
true, the unavailability of funds would be in part 
a result of Congress giving huge tax breaks 
during an economic expansion. If the federal 
government will not claw back that money now 
that it is desperately needed, the states should do 
it themselves.
Third, our proposals all represent good tax 
policy on their own; we are not proposing that 
states conform strategically for no other reason 
than that they can. Take our proposal to impose a 
surcharge on qualfied business income (QBI), for 
instance. If taxpayers responded to our proposed 
state surcharges on QBI by not distorting their 
businesses to generate QBI, then our proposal 
would increase the efficiency of the tax system, 
including at the federal level.
There is another efficiency benefit to our 
proposals. Take depreciation. Given the size of the 
federal tax burden relative to that of any state tax 
burden, or even many states’ tax burdens, the 
state-level tax associated with strategic 
nonconformity will be small. Therefore, firms are 
likely to respond to the federal incentive and not 
change their behavior (much) because of the state-
level change.9
Fourth, as for states with politicians trying to 
avoid framing their decision against the backdrop 
of federal failure, there is a parallel argument. If 
the federal government is correct to be stepping 
back, then the states have to step up — at least to 
an extent. In this way, state (and local) 
governments need to grow in order for the federal 
government to (safely) recede and for the size of 
government to shrink overall.
5
California, a static conformity state, took an intermediate approach. 
It did not update its conformity date but selected specific provisions in 
the TCJA that it would conform with. See Kathleen K. Wright, 
“California Conformity to TCJA (The ‘Light’ Version of Conformity),” 
Tax Notes State, July 29, 2019, p. 405.
6
For further development of some of these arguments, as well as the 
argument that states can conform strategically, see Shanske, “States Can 
and Should Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law,” 45 Ohio N.L. Rev. 
543 (2019).
7
Burgess Everett, “McConnell Slams Brakes on Next Round of 
Coronavirus Aid,” Politico, Apr. 21, 2020.
8
See Jim Tankersley, “How Washington Learned to Embrace the 
Budget Deficit,” The New York Times, May 16, 2020.
9
Shanske, “Expanding State Fiscal Capacity, Part I: Combining an 
Entity-Level Consumption Tax, Improved Sales Factor Apportionment, 
and a Tax on a Federal Windfall (the QBI Deduction),” 22 Fla. Tax Rev. 
448, 462-64 (2019).
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Conformity, the TCJA, and the 
Personal Income Tax
The most significant TCJA changes to the 
personal income tax were modifications to the 
rate schedules, personal exemptions, and the 
standard and itemized deductions.10 The federal 
rate changes obviously did not affect states’ rates 
and many states changed their own laws to offset 
the revenue-raising effects that the other federal 
changes would have had on their residents.11
During this fiscal emergency, states should 
be focused on raising revenue from their most 
fortunate residents to ensure the health, safety, 
and welfare of the entire community. In that vein, 
we suggest that states modify their rate 
structures to make their taxes more progressive 
rather than tinkering with personal exemptions 
or standard deductions. That recommendation 
certainly applies to the nine states that impose 
flat income taxes. Those states should impose 
graduated rates, at least for a limited period (for 
instances, as temporary high-income 
surcharges).
States that already have graduated rate 
structures should also look to either add brackets 
or to raise the tax rates for those in the highest 
brackets. That recommendation applies especially 
forcefully for the many states that have graduated 
structures that are effectively flat. For example, 
the top bracket in many states kicks in once an 
individual has under $20,000 of taxable income.12 
Those structures are progressive in name only. 
And while those states may not be willing to 
abandon their overall economic or political goals 
underlying those effectively flat rate structures, 
they should ask for more from their millionaires 
than from their entry-level schoolteachers during 
a global pandemic. High-income taxpayers 
received the bulk of the tax cuts from the TCJA 
and have greater capacity to shoulder the state tax 
burden. Again, at a minimum, temporary 
surcharges on the highest-income state taxpayers 
could help state governments endure the coming 
fiscal storms.
It is worth underscoring here the tautology 
that an income tax is a tax on income. Suppose 
someone in the restaurant business earned a high 
income in tax years 2018 and 2019, and thus 
profited handsomely from the TCJA. In 2020 this 
taxpayer earns much less because of the 
pandemic. Adding a new higher bracket or two 
will have little or no affect on her while she is 
down, although she might well need to pay more 
when her earnings have been restored.
There is also a more direct way to claw back 
some of the windfall given to high earners by the 
TCJA: States could affirmatively tax their 
residents’ “QBI windfalls.”13 The 20 percent QBI 
deduction of section 199A was one of the more 
questionable provisions in the law14 and served 
largely to retain a consistent tax rate differential 
for taxpayers who earned income through 
investments in C corporations and through 
passthrough entities.15 It is unclear, though, why 
maintaining this arbitrary rate distinction is a 
preferred policy goal, and in any event, the TCJA 
did not completely accomplish that goal. The QBI 
deduction is not available for all taxpayers and is 
subject to a variety of conditions and phaseouts.
The QBI deduction is also highly regressive. 
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that 
more than three-fourths of the benefit would go to 
those earning $200,000 and above.16 Those with 
earnings above $1 million received nearly half the 
benefit.17 The deduction was therefore not only 
distortionary, but regressive as well.
10
The Joint Committee on Taxation, “Estimated Budget Effects of the 
Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, The ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’” (Dec. 18, 
2017).
11
See, e.g., Betsy Z. Russell, “Senate Tax Panel Endorses HB 675, the 
Bill to Raise the Child Tax Credit to $205,” The Spokesman-Review (Mar. 
20, 2018); Scott Dance, “Maryland Senate Passes Bill to Save Taxpayers 
$1.2B in First Response to Trump Tax Reform,” The Baltimore Sun, Feb. 6, 
2018; Martha Stoddard, Joe Duggan, and Emily Nitcher, “Nebraska 
Legislators Pass Measure Tackling Unintended Tax Increases, Other 
Bills,” Omaha World-Herald, Apr. 12, 2018; and Jared Walczak, 
“Minnesota Policymakers Strike Tax Conformity Deal,” Tax Foundation 
(June 11, 2019).
12
Katherine Loughead, “State Individual Income Tax Rates and 
Brackets for 2020,” Tax Foundation (Feb. 4, 2020).
13
Shanske, supra note 9, at 487-99.
14
Daniel Shaviro, “Evaluating the New U.S. Pass-Through Rules,” 1 
Brit. Tax Rev. 49 (2018).
15
Michael S. Knoll, “The TCJA and the Questionable Incentive to 
Incorporate,” Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 977.
16
Joint Committee on Taxation, “Tables Related to the Federal Tax 
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Almost no states conformed to the QBI 
deduction for purposes of their own personal 
income taxes,18 and for good reason. The dubious 
policy reason given for this change at the federal 
level did not apply at the state level given the lack 
of state corporate tax rate changes. The states that 
have not yet decoupled from the section 199A 
deduction should do so now. We also think that 
states should go further and affirmatively tax 
their residents’ QBI windfalls. The section 199A 
deduction granted those residents saves them 
from paying federal income tax on up to 20 
percent of their earnings. That windfall thus 
increased those residents’ tax paying capacities 
and represents a pool of funds that states could 
access in a progressive way to help the entirety of 
the state.
Our proposal would not be to tax the QBI 
benefit retroactively, and so only current and 
future beneficiaries would pay the tax. Further, 
we would propose clawing back the benefit only 
at higher-income levels. Again, the idea is that 
those who can pay more should pay more in the 
current emergency, and that in particular, they 
should pay out of their ill-conceived federal 
windfall.
Conclusion
State and local governments play a critical role 
in the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. 
The pandemic provides a stark reminder that 
states are on the front lines in the effort to 
ameliorate human suffering and that their efforts 
require funding. Strategically rethinking 
conformity with the revenue-raisers included in 
the TCJA can form important components of the 
state government responses, and we thus suggest 
that states take those steps.
Of course, many will argue that now is not the 
time to raise taxes on anyone. We are sympathetic 
with the notion that many are struggling and that, 
all else being equal, tax increases would be best 
avoided. Indeed, if the federal government did its 
job, then additional state-level taxes might not be 
necessary, even if advisable for other reasons. But 
all else is not equal. The public health emergency, 
along with the limited federal response, has 
created a significant and pressing need for 
additional state revenue. States must look for 
ways to raise revenue to ensure both the short- 
and long-term health and success of their 
residents. We have suggested some in this article, 
and states should pay attention to the broader 
range of proposals being outlined as a part of 
Project SAFE as they work to address their 
revenue needs. 
18
Colorado, Idaho, and North Dakota all conform to the federal 
definition of taxable income and none of those states have decoupled 
from the section 199A deduction. Also, Iowa affirmatively elected to 
phase in that deduction in connection with its change in law that will see 
it conform to federal taxable income instead of adjusted gross income. 
See 2018 Acts, ch. 1161, section 70.
©
 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
































Electr nic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3675778
